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Abstract
We need to understand gendered power on a world scale. Research on gender and globalization, and
recent thought about coloniality and Southern theory, provide starting points, but the task of mapping
gender relations in global power centres remains to be done. Four masculinized groups are especially
important in global power relations: the managers of transnational corporations; the oligarchs, possessors of
extreme wealth; the dictators who control authoritarian states; and the state elites of the global metropole.
Some research on gender relations in these milieux is available, showing different patterns of masculinity.
Masculinities are embedded in neoliberal globalization. Gender relations on a world scale are affected by the
movement of metropolitan power into offshore spaces, the conflicts among globally powerful patriarchies,
and the new forms of resistance and social turbulence that arise from triumphant neoliberalism.
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Resumen
Este artículo considera cómo entender el poder generizado a escala mundial. Tanto la investigación sobre
género y globalización como el pensamiento reciente sobre colonialismo y teoría desde el Sur aportan puntos
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de partida, pero todavía nadie se ha puesto a la tarea de hacer una cartografía de las relaciones de género que
operan en y a través de los centros de poder global. Se identifican cuatro grupos masculinizados importantes
para las relaciones de poder global: los administradores de las corporaciones transnacionales; los oligarcas,
poseedores de inmensas riquezas; los dictadores que controlan los estados autoritarios, y las elites estatales
de la metrópoli global. Se considera la investigación disponible sobre relaciones de género en estos medios,
incluyendo diferencias en los patrones de masculinidad. Se reflexiona sobre la relación entre masculinidades
y globalización neoliberal, el movimiento del poder metropolitano hacia espacios más allá de sus fronteras,
los conflictos entre patriarcas globalmente poderosos y las nuevas formas de resistencia y turbulencia social
que surgen del neoliberalismo consolidado.
Derechos Reservados © 2016 Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, Programa Universitario de Estu-
dios de Género. Este es un artículo de acceso abierto distribuido bajo los términos de la Licencia Creative
Commons CC BY-NC-ND 4.0.
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Resumo
Este artigo coloca a questão de como entender o poder de gênero no mundo. Tanto a pesquisa sobre gênero
e globalizac¸ão quanto o pensamento recente sobre o colonialismo e a teoria desde o Sul oferecem pontos de
partida. Porém, a tarefa de mapeamento das relac¸ões de gênero, operantes dentro e através dos centros de
poder mundial, ainda não foi realizada. Identificam-se quatro grandes grupos para as relac¸ões globais de poder
masculinizadas: os gestores de empresas transnacionais; os oligarcas, possuidores de uma grande riqueza; os
ditadores que controlam estados autoritários, e as elites estaduais da metrópole global. Considera-se também
a pesquisa disponível sobre as relac¸ões de gênero nos meios de comunicac¸ão, incluindo as diferenc¸as nos
padrões de masculinidade. Outras reflexões do artigo incluem: a relac¸ão entre masculinidades e globalizac¸ão
neoliberal, o movimento do poder metropolitano para espac¸os além das fronteiras, os conflitos entre patriarcas
poderosos ao nível global e as novas formas de resistência e turbulência social decorrentes do neoliberalismo
consolidado.
Direitos Reservados © 2016 Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, Programa Universitario de Estu-
dios de Género. Este é um artigo de acesso aberto distribuído sob a licença de Creative Commons CC License
BY-NC-ND 4.0.
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Introduction
In everyday language, we talk about gender on the small scale: intimate relationships, personal
identities, husbands and wives, mothers and daughters. But some issues oblige us to think on a
larger scale. The multiple femicides in Cd. Juárez, for instance, make little sense if we think only
about intimate relationships. The events become more meaningful, though no less horrifying, when
we expand the picture to the under-resourced and insecure communities of the Frontera Norte, the
neoliberal maquila economy, the local violence because of the drug traffic, the complicity of
the state, and the wider context of violence and militarization across the regions and the continents
connected with these events (Cruz, 2013).
In grappling with such issues, we need to think about gender on a larger scale than interpersonal
relations or local cultures. Indeed we need to move beyond the national level - the level at which
most statistics of gender inequality are collected and most gender-equity policy is formulated.
R. Connell / Debate Feminista 51 (2016) 3–17 5
Environmental feminism has already made the move. We need to think systematically on a world
scale.
Thinking  gender  globally
There is valuable research literature already available about ‘gender and globalization’, and
‘gender and neoliberalism’ (e.g. Bose & Kim, 2009; Naples & Desai, 2002). But in these debates,
and in the discourse of international liberal feminism found in documents from UN Women, there
is a strong tendency to see globalization or neoliberalism as one thing, and gender or patriarchy
as another, in a quite separate manner.
This is an old problem in feminist theory. Classics such as Heleieth Saffioti’s A mulher  na
sociedade de  classes  (1969) offered a powerful analysis of the interplay between class and gender
since the colonial period, but presupposed a capitalist class system that was logically prior to the
gender effects. Feminists in the United States formulated dual systems theory, resting on what
Zillah Eistenstein (1979, p. 5) called ‘the mutually reinforcing dialectical relationship between
capitalist class structure and hierarchical sexual structuring’, or more plainly, the ‘interdependence
of capitalism and patriarchy’.
In the more recent enthusiasm for the idea of ‘intersectionality’, the idea of a dialectical
relationship has been abandoned. Gender, race, class, nationality, etc. are separate  ways of cate-
gorizing people, which have no logical interconnection. They simply ‘intersect’ or cross-classify
with each other. The cross-classifying adds to some people’s disadvantage and other people’s
privilege. (That was the original purpose of the concept of intersectionality, to seek redress in US
court cases.)
To think about the global dimension of gender, we certainly have to think about the capitalist
world order, and try to understand race, class, and nation. But we do not have to be limited by
such a weak form of theory. A better approach will be to consider how gender itself is global, and
how neoliberal capitalism and its class and race configurations are organized through  gender as
well as interacting with gender relations.
Postcolonial  knowledge
One of the basic problems in understanding gender and power on a world scale is that gender
theory mainly comes from one world region – the most powerful. Even when the discussion is
about femicide in México, sexuality in India, or human rights in Africa, the discussants are usually
deep in the conceptual world of Marx, Foucault, de Beauvoir, and Butler. The bulk of feminist
thought addressing globalization, and circulating globally, is based on theory and methodology
that comes from the global North. Ultimately, it is based on the social experience of the metropole
(as the French called it, in contrast with the colony) – the old imperial centre that is still dominant
in the global economy.
There is a widespread, though usually unstated, assumption that the global South does not
produce theory – especially not theory that can be applied broadly. Thinkers like Nawal el Saadawi
in Egypt or Heleieth Saffioti in Brazil may be respected as activists, or as providing local data,
but are not imagined as a source of generalizable ideas.
In this, feminist thought follows the usual pattern in social science, humanities, and indeed, all
fields of organized knowledge. The Beninese philosopher Paulin Hountondji (1997) identifies a
global division of labour and a pattern of exchange in knowledge. The colonized world served his-
torically as a rich source of data  that were exported to the metropole, while the metropole became
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the site of the theoretical  moment in knowledge production. This global economy of knowledge
has continued in the postcolonial world. It shapes the careers and labour of all intellectual workers
in the periphery.
In recent decades, there has been growing contestation of global-North dominance in feminist
thought (Bulbeck, 1998; Connell, 2014). It is not my purpose in this paper to explore the issues
about knowledge, but it is relevant to notice the issues about gender that postcolonial and global-
South writers have been raising. In a powerful argument, Amina Mama (1997, p. 48) shows that
to understand violence against women in postcolonial Africa, we must understand the violence of
colonialism. Ashis Nandy (1983), in a brilliant study of masculinity in colonialism, showed how
the violence of colonialism shaped the construction of masculinity not only among the colonized,
but also among the colonizers. More recently, Diego Santos Vieira de Jesus (2011) has offered
an impressive general interpretation of the changing patterns of masculinity produced by empire
and by changing global capitalism.
Indigenous writers, such as Aileen Moreton-Robinson (2000) in Australia, and decolonial writ-
ers, such as Maria Lugones (2007), thinking about Latin America, emphasize the formative, not
just intersecting, role of racial division for gender relations in colonial and postcolonial societies.
The great feminist economist Bina Agarwal (1994) in India has emphasized the importance of
land ownership for women’s situation in agricultural society. Indigenous movements in many
regions connect gender with dispossession and land rights. The process of dispossession, central
to colonization itself, was a crucial condition for the formation of the gendered workforces of
colonial society – in households, plantations, and mines – that were mapped by scholars like
Saffioti.
Postcolonial, decolonial, and Southern feminists have thus made an important intervention
in our collective understanding of gender and its politics, triggering shifts that reverberate in the
global North as well as the global periphery (Harding, 2008; Mohanty, 2003). What this movement
has not yet done, though it is an important task for worldwide feminist strategy, is to develop an
understanding of the new global forms of gendered power.
Since these forms are closely connected with the societies of the global North (later I will
discuss how they are moving offshore), we need to use Northern research to illuminate them. This
is not because Northern gender research gives us a universal understanding of gender, as assumed
in the mainstream economy of knowledge. Rather, we need the specificity of this research, its
capacity to document the forms that gender relations and practices take in centres of global power.
In this paper, I will invert the knowledge-making process described by Hountondji (still normal
in global studies of gender), where data from the global South goes into the theory-making machine
of the North. Here, I will use data from the North, in a Southern theoretical perspective on global
power. I agree with Marta Lamas (2011) about the importance, indeed the necessity, of theory for
the feminist movement. But I emphasize that theoretical perspectives of importance have already
emerged from the colonial and postcolonial world (Connell, 2015).
The  world  of  Davos
How do we now understand the commanding heights (to use an old metaphor) of the global
economic and political order, in terms of gender? When we look at the World Economic Forum in
Davos, what do we see – in gender terms? When we look at global military operations, resistance,
terrorism, and peace negotiations, what do we see – in gender terms? When we look at the
so-often-invoked global market forces, what do we see – in gender terms?
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In the global economy, the dominant form of organization is the transnational corporation
(TNC). This is a good place to start thinking about gender, and not just about women. In October
2014, the Executive Director of UN Women, Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka, gave an address to the
World Investment Forum, where she explained that TNCs could do much for the empowerment
of women (UN Women, 2014). Her speech did not consider the nature of power within TNCs,
and that may be just as well. Almost all of their top managers are men.
There is long-established evidence of the deeply gendered character of corporations in the
global North (Cheng, 1996; Cockburn, 1991). To this, we can add studies of managers and elites
in other parts of the world (Olavarría, 2009). Transnational corporations have gendered divisions
of labour. They employ large numbers of women as light-industrial factory hands, and as clerical,
sales, and service workers. They employ large numbers of men as fuel and transport workers,
guards and private police, technicians, and tradesmen. But there are complexities introduced by
scale and global operations.
These complexities are illuminated by Juanita Elias’ (2008) discussion of the garment sector
in Malaysia with its low-wage, gender-divided workforce. Factory management is in the hands
of local men who deploy family networks and political connections, and sustain an ideology
of docile, productive femininity for their workers. At the level of production in the factory, the
firms are still Taylorist and authoritarian. Overall investment and international trade is in the
hands of elite managers, whose working world is very different. Here, there is an ideology of
‘teamwork’. In other industries too the TNC functions through an alliance between different
patterns of masculinity: those sustained by globally mobile elite managers, usually from rich
capital-exporting countries, and local patriarchies in the global periphery.
Transnational corporations, however, are not the only powerful institutions that operate glob-
ally. Worldwide markets, including capital markets and commodity markets, are capable of putting
tremendous pressure on local political systems via currency, credit, and investment strategies.
These markets are institutionalized systems, now strongly technologized, with definite gender
regimes of their own (e.g. Levin, 2001). They are linked via transnational communication sys-
tems, which include telephone and computer systems underlying the Internet, and the globalized
mass media. International economic links are made through the bulk transport systems involved
in international trade, that allow states to pursue the neoliberal ‘comparative advantage’ strategy,
and employ mobile workforces overwhelmingly of men.
The state, long a concern of feminist political strategy (Eisenstein, 1996), does not exist only
at the national or local level. There is a conflict-ridden but increasingly important international
state. This includes the linked military and intelligence systems of major powers (many of them
currently connected in the US-managed ‘war on terror’); the strongly gendered character of the
military is familiar. There is also an international civilian state, which includes the United Nations
system, and agencies like the OECD that provide coordination for the neoliberal policy regime.
In the neoliberal global economy, then, different forms of gendered power come into contact.
As Deniz Kandiyoti (1988) showed long ago, we are not dealing with a homogeneous patriarchy
on a global scale.
Power  holders:  four  groups
Acknowledging that the emerging global gender order is lumpy and variegated, we cannot
approach the question of the top levels of power expecting to find one master centre. In this
section, I will consider some research about patterns of gender among four key social groups, who
on almost any reckoning are major players in global power relations, though they have different
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bases in the institutional terrain just sketched. In making this analysis, I share the view of José
Maurício Domingues (2009) that we can treat modernity as a single, though highly differentiated,
global civilization, which can be understood sociologically.
To give them summary labels, the groups to be considered are as follows: (1) the corporate
managers, who run the TNCs and major financial institutions, such as the World Bank; (2) the
oligarchs, possessors of extreme wealth, whether family or personal; (3) the dictators, i.e.
the political and military controllers of authoritarian states; and (4) the state elites of the global
metropole, the officials (elected and non-elected) of the neoliberal governments of western
Europe and north America. With each, I will ask how we might understand the gender dynamics
they contribute to an emerging global gender order.
The  corporate  managers
In considering gender patterns at the top level of business management, we have to start with
the simple fact that the overwhelming majority of elite managers are men. In 2014, the US business
magazine Fortune  celebrated a ‘historic high’ in the percentage of women among the top managers
of the top 500 transnational corporations. That ‘historic high’ was 4.8%. It fell the following year.
The elite level of transnational corporate management is practically a gender monopoly for men.
This is not the crux of the matter, however. The vital thing is the kind of masculinity, i.e.
configuration of gender practices, embedded in the management milieu (Kerfoot, 1999). In my
research with finance industry managers in Australia (Connell, 2010a), a work-oriented, control-
ling pattern of masculinity was clearly present, strongest among those closest to the top levels of
corporate power. A supportive wife, sometimes with a minor career of her own, was presumed.
A penumbra of other patterns existed, but did not form a clear alternative.
A study of an international merger of finance companies in Scandinavia shows very clearly the
impact of globalization processes. Tienari, Søderberg, Holgersson, and Vaara (2005) conducted
interviews with the top executives of the merged firm, ‘Scanbank’. The senior managers were
almost all men, and took no interest in gender equality. They assumed management was natu-
rally men’s business, ‘constructed according to the core family and male-breadwinner model’.
The researchers conclude that the conditions of transnational business intensify the discourse of
managerial masculinity as competitive, mobile, and work-driven – overriding the Scandinavian
political discourse of gender equality.
Perhaps the most dramatic indication of a strongly masculinized social milieu is Judy
Wajcman’s (1999) study of women managers in globally oriented high-technology firms in Britain.
She found that women managers were under heavy pressure to act just like the men: to work long
hours, fight in the office wars, put pressure on their subordinates, and focus on profit. In order to
survive in this world, the women managers had to re-structure their domestic lives so they, like
the men, could shed responsibilities for childcare, cooking, and housework.
Those are the patterns that emerge at the descriptive level. In understanding how elite man-
agerial masculinity works as a process, two points are crucial. First, the managerial elite is
self-selected; those who rise into it are chosen by those already there. The selection is extreme,
there is an ‘up or out’ pattern, and there is little compassion for those regarded as underperforming.
The rewards, in money and prestige, are very high. Towards the top, annual salaries are in tens
of millions of dollars – equivalent to the interest earnings on fortunes of hundreds of millions of
dollars.
So the pressures for conformity, for acceptance of an institutionally defined hegemonic mas-
culinity, are very strong. It is interesting that the imagery of management created in neoliberal
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media, such as the business newspaper The  Economist, emphasizes ‘teamwork’ (Hooper, 2000).
Nevertheless, the crucial performance tests concern the corporate organization’s core business,
which is to accumulate profit. The modern transnational corporation, when running well with its
patriarchal alliances and gender-divided workforce, is a formidable engine for grasping a growing
share of the social product. When harnessed to a monopoly position in a new and growing market
– as IBM, Microsoft and Google in turn have been – the accumulation of collective wealth and
power is spectacular.
That, in turn, requires a technical conformity, which is not very visible on the outside. This is the
second key point. Modern transnational managers are the real cyborgs of our era. They work within
computer-based intranets that provide prescriptive templates for what they do, and record their
work for review and auditing (Connell, 2010b). They work and travel in an artificial environment of
corporate skyscrapers, jet aircraft, luxury hotels, and limousines, constantly meeting and dealing
with others of their kind. It is not surprising that The  Economist’s representation of managers also
uses technocratic, new-frontier imagery.
There is an almost comical mismatch between the actual labour process in corporate man-
agement and the neoliberal rhetoric of heroic individualism, innovation, and freedom. But there
is nothing comical about the service industries that support this masculine life-world. Here, one
finds the feminized labour of maids, receptionists, secretaries, Personal Assistants, bar hostesses,
high-end sex workers, and in the gated communities they call home, the wives.
The  oligarchs
An old debate, going back as far as James Burnham’s The  Managerial  Revolution  (1943), con-
cerns the managers as a class and their relation to the owners of capital. The managerial revolution
did not quite happen. Though the growing scale of corporations made a managerial workforce
essential to contemporary capitalism, its elite level did not divide socially or politically from the
owners of large capital (Zeitlin, 1974). Nor has this happened under neoliberal globalization,
despite the advent of funds and the offshoring of corporate operations. Immensely rich families
still count for a great deal at the top level of business (Haseler, 2000).
Ownership of large capital through inheritance of family wealth is a significantly different
pathway to elite power from rising through a corporate bureaucracy, and involves different gender
mechanisms. The large family fortunes have usually combined corporate organization of produc-
tion with patriarchal family forms. Inheritance is normally in the male line, women being recruited
as breeders of the next generation of men. (In the absence of male heirs a woman may inherit, but
this is thought anomalous.) The family generally owns a controlling interest, i.e. enough shares
in the group’s holding corporations to control appointments and major decisions.
The sons who inherit the business need two things. One is basic competence in business
management. Without this, family disaster can follow. This happened in Australia to the historic
Fairfax media fortune in 1990. A young inheritor, Warwick Fairfax, took over the company, tried
to privatize it, and drove it to collapse in three years.
The other thing needed is defence against the many predators who circle large fortunes.
Research by Mike Donaldson and Scott Poynting, in their unique book Ruling  Class  Men  (2007),
showed very rich families surrounding their children with protections, both physical and social (a
major function of elite schools). They trained the children in a sense of social superiority, above
all trying to toughen the boys to produce a formidable, dominating masculinity. This is not quite
the same as the cyborg masculinity of the managers – it does not require much technical skill or
integration with corporate intranets. The very rich can hire people to do that for them.
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The group for whom the term ‘oligarchs’ came back into use is the new rich of post-communist
Russia. The neoliberal economy is turbulent and does create chances for rapid accumulation in one
lifetime, usually by establishing a lucrative near-monopoly or inserting oneself into a financing
or delivery chokepoint in a major industry. The Walton, Zuckerberg, and Koch fortunes, as well
as the oil, gas, and media fortunes of Russia, are examples. The famous Enron collapse of 2001,
destroying one of the banner companies of the ‘new economy’ in the USA, came from an attempt
to establish such control in energy supply and financing (Fox, 2003).
The new-rich groups who have arisen in authoritarian regimes are among the most visible of
the oligarchs. They reveal a close relationship between great wealth and state power. The control
of industries such as Russian gas or Chinese media requires constant massaging of political
connections in a homosocial milieu, resulting in pervasive, everyday exchange of favours, bribes,
appointments, rights, and permissions. But this makes even the wealthiest vulnerable to ruthless
political action. This was dramatically shown by Vladimir Putin’s destruction of the oil billionaire
Khodorkovsky, the most prominent of the Russian oligarchs. It is emphasized by the current anti-
corruption campaign in China launched by Xi Jinping. Such moves do not eliminate corruption –
which is a structural feature of the system – but shift the balance of factional power in the ruling
group.
Almost none of the major personal fortunes were established by women. This is not because
of the organizational squeezing-out that happens to women in the corporate bureaucracy. There
is actually a greater diversity of masculinities in the oligarchical world, from Steve Jobs to Silvio
Berlusconi. But there is gendered exclusion all the same. Rapid building of large fortunes depends
crucially on a mixture of political support, financial credit, and deal making in masculinized social
milieux, to which few women have access – except as hostesses.
The  dictators
The violent regimes that came to power in Uruguay and Chile in 1973 became known as ‘civil-
military dictatorship’ (dictadura civico-militar), and this phrase is a useful clue to the character of
authoritarian regimes in the neoliberal era. They combine militarized police power over their own
populations, with civilian involvement in management of the state, and corporate organization
of an export-oriented economy integrated with global markets. The combination was sufficiently
original to make the Pinochet regime a historic pioneer of neoliberalism.
A similar path has been pursued, from different starting points, by post-communist regimes in
much more powerful states, China since Deng, and Russia under Putin. The political controllers
of these regimes are exclusively men – the monopoly is even stronger than among transnational
corporations. The last woman to have major political power in China, Jiang Qing (one of the
so-called ‘Gang of Four’), has been vilified relentlessly by the post-Mao regime.
Around the postcolonial world is a penumbra of dictatorships on a smaller scale, which produce
concentrations of wealth sometimes comparable to oligarchs’ fortunes in the global metropole.
This involves ‘crony capitalism’ where groups close to the regime, profiting from subsidies and
monopolies, do deals with transnational corporations to extract and market their resources (e.g.
Indonesia under the military dictator Suharto; Hadiz & Robison, 2003).
The family dictatorship set up by Ibn Saud in central Arabia a hundred years ago is the most
remarkable. It has amazing wealth, it has leveraged British and US support into a heavily armed,
violent and tightly controlled regime, and it has an ideological agenda. The Saudis have financed
the export, around the Muslim world, of the strikingly misogynistic Wahhabi version of Islam,
and have themselves maintained an absolute exclusion of women from power. There was laughter
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around the world when Saudi Arabia recently tried to become chair of the UN Human Rights
Council. The laughter became sour when its ambassador actually was made chair of a panel of
human rights experts (Brooks-Pollock, 2015).
Most postcolonial dictatorships do not have that kind of stability. Some reasons are indicated
by Achille Mbembe’s brilliant study On  the  Postcolony  (2001), focussed on central Africa. Rul-
ing groups formed from late-colonial male elites built systems of domination based on patronage
relationships. These allowed economic and sexual privilege to the rulers while giving a degree of
social stability. But these regimes were undermined by weakening terms of trade and ‘structural
adjustment programmes’ from the World Bank and IMF. Predatory elites, increasing social turbu-
lence, and multiplication of armed groups became the new normal, with development concentrated
in enclave economies based on deals between transnational business and warlords.
To the extent these conditions hold, no stable gender order will be produced. The gendered
power, to quote an old Maoist phrase, grows out of the barrel of a gun. The arms trade, especially
the supply of light automatic weapons, becomes a factor in the gender order. But that brings us
back to the armed forces, part of the ruling alliance in all authoritarian regimes.
There is a considerable body of research on military forces and gender (e.g. Sinclair-Webb,
2000). Armies have long used collective masculinity as a way to hold their forces together under
the terrible stresses of war. Military training is, in large measure, an emphatic regime for forming
a certain kind of masculinity – emphasizing obedience to orders, solidarity with comrades, fear
of weakness and signs of femininity, willingness to inflict wounds and death, and contempt for
outsiders. It is not surprising that armies and paramilitary forces are rape machines, and produce
death squads for social cleansing. The officers get a modified training because armies need more
than one kind of masculinity, but the same themes run through.
It is not surprising that military dictatorships have usually been patriarchal, homophobic, and
unpopular. The gender regimes of some military forces are now changing, with new technologies
of surveillance, combat and social control, and the recruitment of women in countries with equal
opportunity policies. There is, currently, an interesting re-negotiation of masculinities going on
at management levels in armed forces and the private ‘security’ industry (Connell, 2013). This
has not yet happened in the military wing of civil-military dictatorships.
The  neoliberal  state  elites
Though neoliberal ideology purports to shrink the public sector, the actual shrinking is highly
selective, and mainly concerns services to working-class people. States, especially the states of the
metropole, remain major centres of power. They have, however, been re-shaped internally, and this
has included a re-making of state elites. Bureaucratic forms of rule-bound hierarchy, accompanied
by an ideology of public service, have been replaced by a highly paid contract-based elite, with
an ideology of efficiency and performance. The new elites are oriented to market principles as
much as public service. This is called ‘the new public management’ (Riccucci, 2001).
The most illuminating study of this process came quite early in the neoliberal era, and was
made not in the global North but in settler-colonial Australia. The sociologist Michael Pusey
(1991) showed how public acceptance of neoliberal policy was preceded by an ideological and
professional transformation of the upper levels of the civil service, installing a market ideology
even when a notionally socialist government was in office. Later research in the same country
showed a transformation of the labour process of public sector managers, closer and closer to
the model of corporate management (Connell, 2010b). An older form of bureaucratic paternalism
was thus changed into a more fluid but also more arbitrary and irresponsible patriarchy.
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There are many variants of this story. Alison Woodward’s (1996) study of the European Union
showed how the attempt to create a multinational bureaucracy installed male domination and
masculinized culture in the new organization, as constituent national patriarchies represented
themselves in Brussels.
The rise of Japan to economic power in the l960s and 1970s saw a close cooperation of state
elites and business elites, orchestrated by the famous MITI, the Ministry of International Trade
and Industry. This was a classic state bureaucracy, created in the 1940s. Japanese corporations
at the time had a rule-bound bureaucratic character associated with the ‘salaryman’ model of
managerial masculinity, and a stark gender division of labour between male managers and female
secretaries. It was only near the end of the century, after a period of economic stagnation, that
neoliberal deregulation and organizational change gained strength in Japan. Simultaneously, the
salaryman model of masculinity was criticized and began to change (Roberson & Suzuki, 2003;
Taga, Higashino, Sasaki, & Murata, 2011).
State managers control the public sector organizations and do a lot to determine policies, but
do little to win legitimacy for policies or institutions. That is the role of another elite group,
the politicians, who in metropolitan countries are usually party leaders. Occasionally, they are
oligarchs who try to form a new party or take over an old one. Berlusconi was the most successful,
creating a right-wing party that was essentially an outgrowth of his media and real estate companies
(Ginsborg, 2004). In 2016, Trump has been trying to perform the same feat in the USA.
Because of the electoral/party mechanism, crucial to legitimacy in the metropole, the politicians
are a more diverse group than the corporate managers, the generals, or the inheritors of wealth.
They include leaders of labour or socialist parties (Blair, Hollande), and they include a proportion
of women (Thatcher, Merkel) who are careful to distance themselves from feminism.
Needing to win elections, where, as a result of past feminist struggles, women have the vote, has
usually restrained mainstream politicians from expressing gross misogyny. But nothing compels
them to redistribute resources towards women. Neoliberalism generally redistributes towards the
rich, and (through privatization) shifts resources into market mechanisms where men have stronger
control. Not surprisingly, the historic movement towards wage equality between women and men
has now stalled. An individualized ‘equal opportunity’ regime, without structural change, is the
main result of liberal feminist politics in the metropole.
Reﬂections
After generations of feminist struggle, men with varying forms of privilege still greatly pre-
dominate in positions of global power, in some sectors holding a complete monopoly. Hegemonic
forms of masculinity are still integrated with organizational authority, though in new configura-
tions. Neoliberalism produces, in the managerial and oligarchical sectors, a specific association
of the hegemonic form with the drive for profit, and a ruthless disregard of the consequences for
other people and for the natural environment. This trend is now given symbolic expression in
the United States in the hard-neoliberal ideology of the Tea Party, the climate deniers, and their
billionaire funders such as the Koch brothers.
It is not the case that masculinity as such is logically connected either with profit making or with
the ethical deep freeze and institutionalized cruelty of neoliberalism. As Raúl Prebisch (1982)
argued to the end of his life, ethics is fundamental in thinking about the global economy. There
have been, indeed there still are, paternalistic versions of elite masculinity. However, these versions
now find expression in corporate ‘philanthropy’ – with managerial prerogative to pick and choose
causes, strikingly evident in the Gates Foundation. Such funds do not involve a commitment to an
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institutionalized welfare state, job security for workers, or any redistribution of wealth and power
towards women.
The practical connection between elite masculinities and neoliberalism has a lot to do with the
collective character of profit making in the neoliberal era. In stark contradiction with the ideology
of individualism, the actual labour process in industries like oil (foundation of the Koch fortune)
or information technology (foundation of the Gates fortune) involves the tightly coordinated
operation of a large workforce.
A generation ago, the German sociologist Claus Offe (1976) proved the falsity of the doc-
trine that income reflects individual contributions to profit. In the collective labour of the large
modern corporation, there is no rational  way to measure individual contributions. The pseudo-
measurements that are made reflect partly occupational custom, partly organizational power, and
as feminist research has added, partly the gendered construction of ‘merit’ (Burton, 1987). In
the neoliberal era, with a higher level of technological mediation of production, this argument is
even stronger. Its force is revealed in the cyborg-like, collectivized labour process of corporate
managers – though it is precisely the corporate managers who most directly benefit from the myth
of individual achievement in justifying their huge incomes.
But the character of elite masculinities also has to do with the heterogeneity of profit
streams in global neoliberalism. Unlike the systems models of Marxism and neoclassical
economics, the contemporary global economy does not have one central mechanism of exploita-
tion, income determination, or accumulation. Contrary to the most influential explanations
produced by Northern scholars (e.g. Duménil & Lévy, 2004), we cannot understand neolib-
eralism as arising from system crisis in the global North. Even in the limited terrain of
the four elite groups described above, there are different logics producing major accumula-
tions of wealth. These logics include extractive industry sustained by violence, exploitation
of a mass factory workforce, commodification of public assets formerly held by the state,
monopoly position in a newly created market, and control of choke points in communication and
transport.
The immediate consequence is a great need for transnational integration and coordination
of heterogeneous flows of profit and forms of wealth. Hence the expansion of banking, credit,
insurance, hedging, currency trading and securitization. The much-discussed ‘financialization’ of
capitalism centrally concerns the transformations of one form of profit into another. Hence also
the expansion of the international state: agencies like the IMF and OECD, and the linked security
and surveillance apparatuses.
If we think of these mechanisms and agencies as defining a gendered social milieu, the contin-
ued preoccuption of elite masculinities with power becomes understandable. Elite power does not
work by simple vertical command, but combines command and technical knowledge with capac-
ity for lateral negotiation, deal making, and the building of alliances. That is the combination we
see in the more impressive transnational CEOs.
Here, we come back to the issue with which this paper began: the global dimension of gender.
The deepening of the global economy which has been accomplished by neoliberalism (a matter
of the massive increase of long-distance material trade, as much as financial integration) together
with the elaborating of transnational institutions (corporate, state, communication, market), has
created an increasing capacity for power to move offshore. This is not a matter of moving from
one national base to another, but moving into another kind of geometry where there is not exactly
a national base at all.
Perhaps the first manifestation of this capacity was the appearance of the Eurodollar market
in the 1950s–60s. Dollar-denominated deposits held in banks outside the USA, therefore outside
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the control of the US financial authorities, became the de facto international currency for global
trade and finance.
But the process takes many other forms. Transnational corporations, originating as the overseas
operations of nationally based companies, manipulate transfer prices and relocate their profits to
escape taxation. Some relocate their places of registration to escape other kinds of regulation, and
most now finance their operations by loans and capital raisings from many countries at once. Their
senior managers travel continuously. Their corporate intranets have moved into a de-nationalized
cyberspace, which, courtesy of communications satellites, can be accessed from most parts of the
globe. If you look them up on the Web you may not even be told where the corporation is, you
will just get telephone numbers or Internet addresses. In a sense, Head Office does not exist any
more.
Of course, this is not absolute. Even CEOs need places to lay their heads, and homes and
schools to put their wives and children in. Saskia Sassen (2000) notes the de-territorialization of
power but also recognizes central places where transnational management is concentrated. There
is a gradient from strongly localized power to notably offshored power.
Whatever the gradient, it is important to think about the implications that the process of
offshoring has for gender relations. Just as it takes corporate profits out of the control of national
tax and fiscal authorities, offshoring takes the daily lives of powerful people increasingly out of
the influence of local gender regimes, cultures, and politics. We saw a striking example of that
with the Scanbank corporate executives. Feminism is strong in the Scandinavian countries, but
there is no feminist movement in international banking.
Offshoring to escape taxation points to another important feature of global gendered power.
There are endemic conflicts between different groups in the global elite. Among them are taxation;
territory (Crimea, Senkaku Islands); cyber-espionage; human rights agendas; climate policy. There
have been attempts to coordinate these groups, going back to the 1970s when the Rockefellers
funded the ‘Trilateral Commission’ to link business, government, and intellectual elites in the
USA, Japan, and western Europe (Sklar, 1980). More recently, the OECD has researched and
coordinated policy among the rich neoliberal states. The Davos meetings of the World Economic
Forum have provided a discussion venue for corporate and state elites.
None of these have produced a strong mechanism for practical collaboration on a world scale.
In no sense should speaking of a global elite imply consensus and cultural agreement. Tension
and contestation is normal. At this level, we cannot assume a stable gender order or an established
hegemony. At best, there is a convergence of groups embodying different forms of patriarchy,
who in the neoliberal global economy are compelled to negotiate with each other. There is no
single hegemonic masculinity here.
But there are shared interests. Above all, there is a shared interest in the preservation of the
institutional order that makes the concentration of profit and the preservation of fortunes possible.
That is to say, all these groups of power holders seek to preserve the apparatus of private property,
the state system of enforcement, the corporate mechanism of production, and the international
system of circulation and finance.
The defence of this institutional apparatus against the resistances and oppositions that the
neoliberal order generates is not a pretty business (Gutiérrez Sanín & Schönwälder, 2010). It
involves a militarized policing of geographical and social boundaries, with punitive expeditions
and occupations that suspend any rule of law. The shock treatment that establishes neoliberal
regimes creates liminal zones in which the criminality of the powerful flourishes, as seen in the
aftermath of one of these punitive expeditions to the colonial world, the US invasion of Iraq
(Whyte, 2007).
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The legitimacy of this institutional order has never been complete. In earlier generations, it was
challenged by metropolitan labour movements and colonial insurgencies, imagining alternative
social worlds. These movements have largely been defeated or incorporated by the combination of
brutality, bribery, and fragmentation that is a large part of humanity’s recent history. The electoral
politics of the metropole is now fought out within a neoliberal elite, offering at most alternative
emphases within the corporate economy; no other social group has a chance of coming to power
legitimately.
But the anger that drove socialist and anti-colonial movements remains alive in the neoliberal
era. The conditions of mass poverty, growing inequality, and blocked development have created
great cultural disturbances around masculinity (Ghoussoub, 2000). And with the death of the
egalitarian hopes historically expressed in the Pantjasila  in Indonesia, in Ambedkar’s constitution
of India, in China’s peasant revolution, in CEPAL, in Arab socialism, in the triumph of the
ANC—other forms of opposition have developed which are emphatically not egalitarian.
Which is where Kalashnikovs come in. Created by a state design team including the Red
Army sergeant who was officially credited, the AK-47 was a simple, tough and extremely reliable
automatic rifle, an infantry weapon that has never been bettered. Mass produced to re-equip
the biggest army in the world, then for the USSR’s satellites and allies, and then flooding the
international arms market and becoming the symbol of insurgencies, after seventy years, there are
estimated to be 100 million AK-47s, or variants, in the world. Meanwhile, the US arms industry
was producing its own flood of personal weaponry, supplying military forces, private gun owners,
and the drug trade.
Between the two flows, supplemented from other places, it has become easy for insurgencies
and private armies to become well armed. The social turbulence, mass poverty, and despair that
has generated the international drug trade, fundamentalist militancy, and separatist and nation-
alist movements have become, increasingly, lethal. It is not entirely by chance that the US state
progressed, over a generation, from a War on Poverty, to a War on Drugs, to a War on Terror.
The dynamics of neoliberal globalization have generated oppositions and conflicts that, in
gender terms, take the shape of masculinity challenges. This is familiar in studies of interpersonal
violence (Tomsen, 1997). Here, they are projected on a larger scale, and in contexts where military
weapons turned on civilian targets often suit the strategies of the protagonists. That is to say, the
global elites are increasingly confronted with dispersed oppositional masculinities that work in
novel ways and have few inhibitions about violence, from Islamic State to Los Zetas.
Not just a power-oriented masculinity but also a cultivated callousness is involved in organizing
abductions of girls, suicide bombings, femicide, beheadings, and mass addiction. It seems close
to the callousness involved in drone strikes, mass sackings, structural adjustment programmes,
nuclear armaments, and the relentless destruction of our common environment. Mahatma Gandhi
was once asked for his opinion of Western civilization. He replied, ‘It would be a good idea’.
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